The number of institutions affected by Hurricane Katrina created unexpected demands on some servicers' back-up sites. You will want to ensure that your back-up facility has adequate capacity to process transactions in a timely manner.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina turned a national spotlight on the politics of race, sex, property, and power in the city of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. While historically a profoundly interracial and international city, images associating New Orleans with poverty and blackness flooded media outlets across the world. These images illuminated the profound complications the city’s history of slavery, segregation, and systematic racial oppression had on the evacuation process, clean up, recovery, and on the return of thousands of New Orleanians. By including a broad selection of resources–from films and policy documents to newspaper articles and scholarly essays–this bibliography seeks to capture the tangled nature of this on-going process, and describe the dynamics of race in post-Katrina New Orleans. When read alongside the accompanying titles across the bibliography, it becomes clear that much changed in New Orleans after the hurricane, but much also remained the same.
This government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) member agencies (regulatory agencies) and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors are relaying comments made by financial institutions regarding lessons they learned from the effects of Hurricane Katrina. Financial institutions have responded admirably to the unique challenges raised by successive hurricane seasons with significant storms. Major challenges faced by these institutions included the following:
Hurricane Katrina: Facts, Damage & Aftermath - Live …
Hurricane Katrina illustrated that a widespread disaster can strand employees without access to working land-line or cellular telephone services. You may want to develop, test, and update a contact list for senior management, employees, customers, vendors, and key government agencies. Maintaining copies of this information at all sites, plus one or more off-site locations, can be very helpful in the event of a disaster.
Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts - CNN
National Research Council. Environmental Public Health Impacts of Disasters: Hurricane Katrina, Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina Slams Into Gulf Coast; Dozens Are …
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many financial institutions had employees scattered across the region with limited access or means to reach the institutions' facilities. To address this, some institutions arranged alternate transportation methods, e.g., carpools, bus services, and air connections. Some institutions also developed plans to shift and transport employees either from or into affected areas.
Hurricane Andrew The Facts And The Experience Writework Essa
According to Hugh Kaufman, an EPA senior policy analyst, environmental regulations in place to prevent the types of discharges that occurred during Hurricane Katrina were not enforced, making what would have been a bad situation much worse. Unchecked development throughout ecologically sensitive parts of the region put further stress on the environment’s ability to absorb and disperse noxious chemicals. “Folks down there were living on borrowed time and, unfortunately, time ran out with Katrina,” Kaufman concludes.
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Citys Emergency Office 'Failed'
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a New Orleans Police captain, Timothy P. Bayard, prepared an internal report assessing the role played by his city's Office of Emergency Preparedness. He introduced the report to investigators by saying: "The New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness failed. They did not prepare themselves, nor did they manage the city agencies responsible for conducting emergency response to the disaster. Their function was to coordinate with state, federal and other local agencies, to enlist logistical assistance. We did not coordinate with any state, local or federal agencies. We were not prepared logistically. Most importantly, we relocated evacuees to two locations where there was no food, water or portable restrooms. We did not implement the pre-existing plan. We did not utilize buses that would have allowed us to transport mass quantities of evacuees expeditiously. We did not have food, water or fuel for the emergency workers. We did not have a back up communication system. We had no portable radio towers or repeaters that would have enabled us to communicate. The other mistakes have been mentioned previously."